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SINCE the conclusion of the world war, searching questions have
been asked of the future. In what respects will this new era
be different from the old? In what direction is civilization really
moving? What is the underlying drift in this post-war world?
Passing events have called forth a number of hasty generalizations.
When Communist revolutions swept Russia and Hungary, tKe world
was said to be moving toward the "rule of the proletariat." When
Mussolini in Italy and de Rivera in Spain seized the reins of gov-
ernment, the mood of the day was said to be "a search for dic-
tators." When Premiers MacDonald of England and Herriot of
France appeared on the scene, observers declared that the nations
had begun a "swing to the left." When Baldwin in Great Britain
and Coolidge in the United States won imposing victories at the
polls, the world was declared to be seeking "shelter in conservatism."
As each new set of actors comes upon the stage, another irresistable
movement is discovered. The fact is, however, that the various
trends overlap, wane, and recur, so that the total impression is one
of confusion. If we are journalistic in our attitude, and seize upon
the event of the hour as significant, we are bouyed up or depressed
by each day's news. If we endeavor to fit all the conflicting trends
into a consistent pattern, we find that the facts are seemingly self-
contradictory.
Unfortunately, certain morbid tendencies of the present move-
ment are all too clear. Democracy is on the wane, and is being
supplanted in Europe and South America by governments which
rely essentially on coercion. The masses seem content to be gov-
erned by strong minorities, if only they are efficiently governed. To
WHERE THE WORLD IS GOING 89
theoretical arguments in favor of liberty men and women pay little
attention. Only experience with oppression teaches mankind to
value freedom. After a few generations the memory of former
tyranny grows dim, and a new tyranny, dressed in some specious
philosophy, establishes itself. The old human propensity to make
others do as we wish then reasserts itself. Russia has been suppres-
sing free speech in order to fight and exclude Capitalism ; the I nited
States has been suppressing free speech in order to fight and exclude
Bolshevism. Those who expected that the privileges of free speech,
free assemblage, and self-government would be rehabilitated as the
passions of the war died down now know that they delude them-
selves. Time alone does not bring stabilization and freedom.
In our post-war era the extremes of the political scale are driven
further apart. Liberalism has been stretched to radicalism, to com-
munism, to proletarianism. Conservatism has been extended to die-
hard Toryism, to Fascism, to Caesarism. Russia at this moment
stands further to the Left, and Italy further to the Right, than did
any nation before the world war. In some countries, like Great
Britain, the center or liberal party gradually disintegrates, while
radicalism and toryism grow in strength at its expense. The pen-
dulum of political oscillation swings across a wider arc than in the
past. These extremes react upon and embitter each other, and may
lead very possibly in some countries to civil wars.
At the same time the barriers to international violence seem
to have grown more rather than less brittle. The eagerness with
which nations exploit exclusive sources of raw materials, like rub-
ber or oil, to the industrial detriment of other nations ; the increasing
exasperation of the colored races, yellow, brown, and black, under
the exactions of white imperialism; the resumption of rivalry in
armaments, which when confined at one point, breaks out in another :
the intense preoccupation of statesmen with alliances and national-
istic understandings ; the new radiance which has come to invest pa-
triotic ideals; all these signs appear to portend further great wars.
We have with us, now as always, certain dogmatic theorists
who profess to read the whole future like an open book. Unfor-
tunately, however, these theorists divide sharply into rival camps.
One group calls for optimism; the other group for pessimism.
According to the hopeful prophets, the miseries of this post-war
era, its constant alarms, minor wars, political excesses, and economic
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shortages are the inevitable after-effects of the great conflict; tre-
mors which naturally follow an earthquake in human affiairs ; flare-
ups from a conflagration which is dying down and ultimately will be
extinguished. All great wars, it is said, are followed by disturb-
ances. In due time we shall return to stability, and resume the on-
ward march of humanity. The future, so these optimists maintain,
holds unlimited possibilities, industrial and scientific. Ultimately we
shall conquer war, poverty, and vice. Our children will live in a
more sober, more productive, more efficient, and hence a happier
society. In a word, progress is inevitable, and though the curve of
progress may show occasional zigzags and temporary retrogressions,
its long-time trend is steadily upward.
No such rosy developments are foreseen by the pessimists.
They fear that mankind has turned the wrong corner; when the
world has recovered from its prostration it will be plunged by its
ineradicable hates and its irrational fears into fresh wars. Neither
pacifists nor Leagues can prevent the nations from asserting their
conflicting ambitions. 'Modern science has rendered warfare so
devastating that one or two struggles will destroy civilization. Each
successive upheaval will be accompanied by blacker reaction and
followed by more desperate revolt. Spiritually, say the pessimists,
the modern world is sick ; radically, it is decadent. The inferior
human stocks are swamping the better strains. Our complex civili-
zation will collapse of its own weight when its biological foundations
have crumbled. The end of all must be a new Dark Ages, with
centuries of painful effort to regain lost ground. 1 We can do little
or nothing to arrest this slip down into the dark. In brief, the
history of mankind moves in cycles, with alternate epochs of civili-
zation and savagery ; and we are now on the downward slope of
the curve.
Either of the foregoing theories may be made to appear plausible
if the evidence to support it is selected with sufficient partiality.
But all such doctrines savor too much of predestination. Who can
really prove that some inner necessity drives civilization either along
an ascending spiral, or around a sagging circle? The history of
mankind is not long enough as yet to enable us to formulate a rigid
"law of progress." We of this generation shall do well if we are
able to predict the next long swing.
1 This cyclical theory has received a brilliant exposition by Oswald Spengler
in his Der Untcrgang des Abendlandes.
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Before we can undertake a realistic prediction of the future,
we need to glance back to the liberal and humanitarian movements
of the past. We need to recall the rise and decline of liberalism,
which constituted the outstanding chapter in the history of the last
hundred years. In particular we must not forget to note, at the
end of the chapter, the portentious footnote of Socialistic revolt.
Treitschke declared that Liberalism was the one really new
thing that the Nineteenth Century produced. As a matter of
historical development, however, the liberalism of the Nineteenth
Century grew directly out of the idealism of the Eighteenth Century.
Those doctrines of natural and inalienable rights, and those declara-
tions of religious, political, and economic freedom, which \ oltaire,
Rousseau, Locke, Adam Smith, and a score of other radical spirits
had proclaimed to an earlier generation, were the texts on which
the liberals drew and relied. The liberals took the next step : they
applied principles to institutions. In that "long transition from
feudality to the present time," liberalism was a logical though transi-
tory phase.
The liberal movement left its mark on the whole Western world
;
but its manifestations differed from country to country according
to national character and circumstance. After the tremendous up-
heaval of her great revolution, France experienced oscillations be-
tween republicanism and monarchism, lasting until the establish-
ment of the Third Republic. In the United States, after the War
for Independence and the adoption of the constitution, democratic
and liberal ideas had practically a free field for many decades. In
Germany, Austria, and Italy, liberal doctrines led first to the revolts
of 1842, and later to a long series of social reforms.
It was in England, however, that liberalism came to a full, though
tardy, bloom. The excesses of the French Revolution evoked a
strong tory reaction across the Channel. Indeed, so perturbed were
Englishmen that, as Macaulay says,2 there was scarcely a man in the
country with a good coat on his back who did not join in the hue
and cry against France and against republican theories. The Brit-
ish radicals of those davs—who would be considered very mild
fellows now—were subjected to an intensive persecution, and were
jailed, mobbed, and deported. This persecution furnishes a strik-
ing historical parallel to the hounding of radicals and Reds in the
2 Essav on the Younger Pitt.
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United States after the world war, when the propertied classes in
America had been terrified by the spectacle of Bolshevism in Europe.
By the eighteen-thirties of the last century toryism in England
was on the run. The Whig Party became the Liberal Party, and
adopted for its creed the doctrines of laissez faire and individualism
elaborated by Bentham and Mill. Political leaders such as Cobden,
Bright, and Gladstone forced through a program of free trade, par-
liamentary reform, extention of the suffrage, colonial self-govern-
ment, and non-interference in foreign affairs. The Liberal Party was
the dominating political force in Britain for the next half century.
Looking back over a hundred years it can scarcely be denied that
the achievements of liberalism were substantial. Some of its more
important victories were these: freedom of worship and the re-
moval of religious disabilities ; the establishment of representative
government on the basis of manhood suffrage; the abolition of
slavery throughout most of the world ; the reform of prisons and
the softening of the penal code; the spread of elementary education;
and an impetus to economic productivity through guarantees of
equal opportunity. The world of the last century and the world
we know today would be vastly different had not the liberals won
their early battles.
The nature of Nineteenth Century liberalism is now frequently
misrepresented. In our time the creed of liberalism has been
watered down to a vague enthusiasm for social welfare in general,
which finds adequate expression in that loose formula : "the great-
est good of the greatest number." But the driving force behind the
liberalism of the last century was a passion for liberty. Those early
and orthodox liberals had a lively faith in the curative power of
freedom. In their attacks on caste government, on religious in-
tolerance, on slavery, on colonial oppression, and on tariffs and trade
restrictions, they were animated chiefly, though perhaps not solely,
by the determination to set men free. Their notion of the essential
character of liberty may have been a little naive. It is possible
now to perceive that the early liberals were too much inclined to
identify liberty with liberation, and too ready to believe that once
the shackles of the Past were stricken off, men and women would
quite automatically become good, and prosperous, and happy. None
the less freedom was to them the method and measure of progress.
And fundamentally they perhaps were right.
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At the very time, however, that liberalism appeared to be tri-
umphant, its influence and prestige began to wane. Not only did it
fail to push its way through the weakened defenses of monarchism
in Central and Northern Europe, but it began to sicken in the house
of its friends. For a variety of reasons this turn in the tide of
opinion remained hidden from the majority of thinking men and
women. Its outward manifestations took several decades to de-
velop. The contraction of empires ceased, and a new movement of
colonial expansion began, this time marked by the absorption of
lands inhabited by backward peoples and rich in natural resources.
Great Britain built up a mighty new empire of crown colonies, and
France carved out a colonial domain only second in size. German}-,
Italy, Belgium, and most of the other powers joined in the scramble,
a little late. A succession of colonial wars, notably by reason of
their sordid deceptions and unusual barbarities, proved almost in-
variably successful for the European expeditions. Slavery in a
thinly disguised form was reintroduced in various parts of Africa
and Asia ; and in some colonial areas, particularly in \\ estern
Africa, the enforced labor of natives was maintained by torture and
atrocity. A new race of armaments, on land and sea, was started
and accelerated.
These manifestations of liberal decay did not attract the attention
they warranted because they took place largely in the half-hidden
realm of foreign affairs; whereas in the field of domestic politics
the impetus of liberalism had not yet spent itself. Movements were
on foot for the extension of the suffrage to women, for old age pen-
sions, for a shorter working day, for safeguarding the laborer's
safety and health, for higher taxes on unearned incomes, and for a
firmer democratic control of the machinery of government. In
Britain those leaders who, like Morley and Campbell- 1 'annerman,
objected to imperialistic adventures, were held to be old-fashioned,
while the younger generation of liberals—Grey, Asquith, Haldane,
Lloyd-George and their kind—successfully made the straddle be-
tween reaction abroad and progress at home by denominating them-
selves "Liberal Imperialists," and by invoking the spell of the new
black magic of the age, national efficiency. The same tendencies
manifested themselves elsewhere. Germany, for example, estab-
lished an elaborate and beneficient system of social insurance within
her borders, and launched an intelligent attack on the problems of
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poverty, disease, and crime ; and at the time she pursued in her
foreign relations a policy of blood and iron. So while the old forms
and labels remained, the spirit of liberalism was evaporating. The
former respect for the individual as such, the enthusiasm for tol-
erance, and the cosmopolitan good-will gave way to a new discipline,
a new self-righteousness, and a new truculence. After 1880 liber-
alism was like a spent bullet: it still travelled, but its momentum
was slackening.
The sickness of liberalism in the last quarter of the Nineteenth
Century, although for the most part unnoticed, did not escape com-
ment from a few astute observers. In 1874 John Morley wrote: 3
Within the last century England has lost one by one each
of those enthusiasms which may have been delusions, but
which at least testified to the existence among us of a vivid
belief in the possibility of certain broad general theories
being true and right, as well as in the obligation of making
them lights to practical conduct and desire. . . . It is
possible that the comparatively prosaic results before our
eyes at the end of all have thrown a chill over our political
imagination. The old aspirations have vanished, and no
new ones have arisen in their place.
In a book published in 1904, ten years before the beginning of
the world war, L. T. Hobhouse marshalled evidence to prove how
widespread and profound was the reaction against liberal ideals,
and sought to explain the causes of the reaction.4 Hobhouse said:
During some twenty, or it may be thirty years, a wave
of reaction has spread over the civilized world and invaded
one department after another of thought and action. This
is no unprecedented occurrence. In the onward movement
of mankind, history shows us each forward step followed
by a pause, and too often by a backsliding in which much
of the ground gained is lost. Of the causes of this rythmical,
yet tragic alteration we know little. Does popular govern-
ment, with the influence which it gives to the press and the
platform, necessarily entail a blunting of moral sensibility,
a cheapening and vulgarization of national ideals, an ex-
tended scope for canting rhetoric and poor sophistry as a
3 On Compromise, London, 1874.
4 Democracy and Reaction, London, 1904.
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cover for the realities of the brutal rule of wealth? Or
should we rather trace the reaction to the temper of the
time and the mode of thought prevailing- in the world? Is
it that after the great reforming movement of the Nine-
teenth Century a period of lassitude has set in ; that the
ideals of the reform have lost their efficiency; that its
watchwords cease to move, while the blank thus left is filled
in by shallow philosophies or sheer materialism.''
In America this note of disillusionment with liberalism and
democracy made itself heard somewhat later. 5 Of course, after the
catastrophies of the great war, and its sequel of unhappy peace, the
discomfiture of the Liberal parties became apparent to everyone. In
late years liberalism has shrunk visibly, not only on prestige, but in
numbers of adherents.
The war itself dealt a shattering blow to liberalism. After the
conflict was over, hosts of people turned away from the Liberal
parties in disgust, and moved toward either radicalism or conser-
vatism. In whatever countries the liberals were in control at the
beginning, during the course, or at the conclusion of the war, they
managed to belie and abandon their liberal principles. They gave
lip service to liberal ideals and made effective use of liberal slogans,
but they shaped their policies and deeds in the spirit of British and
American Toryism, French Bourbonism, and German Junkerism.
It is obvious now that the world war was basically a huge scramble
for power, commerce, and colonies. Its motivating forces were mu-
tual fears and mutual greeds. But these ancient motives could not,
so the Liberal statesmen thought, be frankly avowed in a world
which had been fed for more than a century on democratic dogmas.
So the war, ethically speaking, had at all times two aspects : an outer
and fabricated pretense of noble and endangered ideals, and an inner
and realistic core of sordid plots and bargains. The agreements and
undertakings which precede the outbreak in 1914, and which de-
termined the alignments of contending forces, were concluded sur-
reptitiously by foreign ministers and by cabinets, and were brazenly
denied in parliaments. During the course of the conflict the word
propaganda became a synonym for lying. Occasionally some one
would blurt out the truth, as when a German Chancellor admitted
5 See, for example, The New Democracy; by Walter E. YVeyl, published
in 1912; and Liberalism in America, by Harold Stearns, published in 1919.
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that he regarded this country's guarantee of Belgian neutrality as
a mere scrap of paper. When the fighting was once in full swing,
debate behind the lines was suppressed. Far beyond the needs of
military censorship, free speech was suspended, protests were
stifled, and dissenting minorities were dragooned into silence.
Safely sheltered behind the flames of popular passion which war
always kindles, small cliques began, ran, and concluded the war.
When the peace settlements were being arranged at Paris, the
Allied Governments brought forward a number of secret treaties
which they had negotiated among themselves during the struggle,
by the terms of which they had generously promised each other
everything in sight. These secret treaties were urged as justifica-
tion for the dishonor of violating the terms of the Armistice. Who
indeed needed to bother to keep his word with the atrocious and per-
fidious Germans ? Were they not beaten, helpless ? To their shame,
the American representatives at the Peace Conference signed and
later defended the notorious treaties of Versailles, which gave to
dishonor the force of law.
Doubtless those European statesmen who in the name of high
motives tramped on every moral principle in order to win the war
and to gather its spoils, were something better than crafty con-
spirators. They were in part men of confused mind, blinded by
the glamour of that new nationalism which covers an old barbarism.
But the fact remains that they were devious and disingenuous, and
that by their successful deceptions they trifled with the lives and
happiness of millions. They did not scruple to make use of men-
dacity in order to manipulate the passions, loyalties, and sacrifices of
whole nations. By many men and women who are still war-minded,
these leaders are honored even today. But by many others they are
scorned; and the "liberalism" which they preached and betrayed is
viewed with skepticism, or suspicion, or disdain.
The world does not yet realize what a loss it has sustained in the
disruption of liberalism. For that disruption the liberals them-
selves are, of course, chiefly to blame. They have been traitors
to every liberal principle except free trade, and even on that score
they have been lukewarm. The critics of liberalism have asserted that
liberals ceased to think with the death of John Stuart Mill, and that
they lost their grip on affairs when they failed to evolve an eco-
nomic program to supplement their political program. Is it now
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too late to formulate a new liberal program? Certainly little is be-
ing done at present to put fresb content into the old slogans.
While liberalism was gradually transforming itself into an in-
tellectual and moral vacuum, Socialism was rushing in to take its
place. Few people realize how recent a phenomenon Socialism, in
the Marxian sense, really is. Das Kapital, it is true, was first pub-
lished in German in 1867. But the ideas of Karl Marx, that aristo-
cratic German Jew who married a Countess and who spent the best
years of his life in the British Museum studying all the theories of
economic value from the Sixteenth Century forward,—the ideas of
this founder of "scientific" socialism were slow to penetrate into
other lands. The first translation of Capital was made into Russian
in the seventies—a fact of some significance in view of later events.
But the book was not translated into English or French until the
nineties, and did not appear in many other languages until after
the opening of the Twentieth Century. Of course most people
obtained their ideas of scientific socialism not from translations of
Das Kapital, but from popular expositions or refutations of the
Marxian thesis.
Before 1914 the Socialists wrote, ranted, held conferences,
quarrelled, split hairs, organized political parties, and had consider-
able influence on social legislation. But they controlled no great
nation. Then in the Russian Revolution of October, 1917, they ex-
ploded into a world power. The Bolshevists have just celebrated
the tenth anniversary of the inauguration of their reign. In Russia
they seem firmly intrenched.
Many persons have expressed surprise that the Soviet Govern-
ment, with its extreme economic doctrines, has managed to stay in
the saddle so long. But it is really far more surprising that the
previous reign of the Czars and the Grand Dukes, a foul and op-
pressive tyranny, endured for several hundred vears. All kinds of
government, including the worst, seem to "work." The Soviet
regime, with its vigorous program for the improvement and en-
lightenment of the proletariat, that is, of the working masses, and
despite its use of terroristic methods and its suppression of free
discussion, is certainly not the worst government the world has
seen, or tolerates today.
But does Communism hold the future in its hands? Is it the
beacon that will eruide the world out of its follv and unrest to the
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happy land of social peace and plenty? The Bolshevists are daily
assailed by their critics in other countries with hatred and fury.
But we must not disguise from ourselves the fact that there are mil-
lions of people throughout the world who are watching the Russian
experiment with a furtive hope in their hearts that it will be a
brilliant success. Why? Because these millions are in some degree
dissatisfied with their own social and economic arrangements and
with their own way of life, and are looking somewhere—anywhere
—for deliverance. And the Communists believe in themselves ; they
have faith; a religious fervor. In all the Allied countries patriots
lay wreaths and say prayers at the shrine of an Unknown Soldier.
But in Russia they lay their flowers and say their prayers at the
tomb of Lenin. A faith of this sort is a contagious thing. Religions
have often in the past spread beyond the borders of the country in
which they were born.
But the future does not belong to Communism—not as exempli-
fied in Russia today. Of course any prediction of the human future
must of necessity reflect the personal bias, and the hopes, of him
who predicts. Yet certainly, looking back over the social aspirations
and struggles of the last century and a half, it would be presumptu-
ous to assert that liberalism must die utterly, without contributing
anything further to social and political doctrine and practice. Liber-
alism meant, in essence, liberty; and liberty is a food that modern
man will not permanently do without, however tempting the sub-
stitutes offered. On the other hand, proletarianism unquestionably
holds a core of truth which will survive. The idea that the interests
of the toiler are paramount to those of the social parasite, no matter
how glittering, and the idea that labor has first claim not only to its
economic hire but to economic surpluses, these ideas, once let loose
in the world, are not likely to be exterminated.
The tomorrow of our world will be dominated by a social phi-
losophy which is even now being hammered out on the anvils of ex-
perience. If this philosophy must have a name, it is best designated
as Labor-Liberalism. Many minds will work together for its elabor-
ation. It will be no thin, violent, one-sided creed, but will embrace
all the essential social values. It will not sacrifice liberty to equal-
ity, nor pity to justice. Such an all-inclusive, sane, social philosophy
is possible, and it will succeed.
